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ABSTRACT
There is a growing movement throughout the Department
of Defense (DoD) towards the implementation of Network
Centric Warfare (NCW). In an effort to transition to NCW,
the Navy has fielded many different technologies. One
system exploiting new technologies in the Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) domain is the Joint
Fires Network/Tactical Exploitation System-Navy (JFN/TES-
N), which was developed from the Army Tactical Exploitation
System, (TES-A).
This system was developed rapidly and uniquely for
fleet deployment in accordance with the interim acquisition
guidance signed by the Honorable Paul Wolfowitz. This
guidance authorized Evolutionary Acquisition following a
Spiral Development process in lieu of the “traditional”
cold war process described in the DoD 5000 series
publications. Assuming that JFN/TES-N will be viewed as a
successful acquisition, several Navy personnel have stated
that it may become the model for future C4I (and other)
system acquisitions. This thesis seeks to help develop that
model. The objectives of this thesis are:
• To examine whether the TES-N acquisition process
is an appropriate model of Evolutionary
Acquisition following a Spiral Development.
• To identify and make recommendations for changes
or improvements to the TES-N acquisition program,
so it can be used as a more appropriate model for
Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral
Development.
vi
This thesis concludes that Evolutionary Acquisition
following a Spiral Development shown with the JFN/TES-N
system is an acquisition policy that is appropriate for
programs of the same size and scope, but larger more
complex programs will not have as much success. Yet, in
order for the JFN/TES-N program and future programs using
Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral Development to
succeed, changes have to be made in policies such as
budgetary submissions, test and evaluation, policy,
process, and training.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
There is a growing movement throughout the Department
of Defense (DoD) towards the implementation of Network
Centric Warfare (NCW). In an effort to transition to NCW,
the Navy has fielded many different technologies. One
system exploiting new technologies in the Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) domain is the Joint
Fires Network/Tactical Exploitation System-Navy (JFN/TES-
N), which was developed from the Army Tactical Exploitation
System, (TES-A).
This thesis explains that JFN/TES-N was developed
rapidly and uniquely for fleet deployment in accordance
with the interim acquisition guidance signed by the
Honorable Paul Wolfowitz. This guidance authorized
Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral Development
process in lieu of the “traditional” cold war process
described in the DoD 5000 series publications. Assuming
that JFN/TES-N will be viewed as a successful acquisition,
several Navy personnel have stated that it may become the
model for future C4I (and other) system acquisitions. This
thesis seeks to help develop that model. The objectives of
this thesis are:
• To examine whether the TES-N acquisition process
is an appropriate model of Evolutionary
Acquisition following a Spiral Development.
• To identify and make recommendations for changes
or improvements to the TES-N acquisition program,
so it can be use as a more appropriate model for
Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral
Development.
xvi
In order to examine the TES-N acquisition process as a
model for future system acquisitions, and make
recommendations for changes to it if appropriate, this
thesis reports the results of a literature search to
explicitly determine the characteristics of each of these
documented processes. Next, this thesis extracts the
salient characteristics of the TES-N acquisition process
through interviews with key personnel at the TES-N program
office. Next, this thesis use the breakdown of Evolutionary
Acquisition following a Spiral Development in the article,
The Promise and Perils of Spiral Acquisition: A Practical
Approach to Evolutionary Acquisition by COL Wayne M.
Johnson, USAF (Ret) and Carl O. Johnson as a model for
Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral Development and
the DoD 5000 series documents as a model for the
“traditional” acquisition policy, to reveal key points that
highlight relative differences between the two as a basis
for characterizing the JFN/TES-N acquisition process. Next,
the results of surveying fleet personnel show the user’s
opinion on the new system’s performance. Finally, this
thesis reports the results of interviews of operators and
decision makers aboard the USS CORONADO, flagship of
Commander Third Fleet (C3F) and makes recommendations based
upon my findings for future programs with an acquisition
process similar to Evolutionary Acquisition following a
Spiral Development.
This thesis concludes that Evolutionary Acquisition
following a Spiral Development shown with the JFN/TES-N
system is an acquisition policy that is appropriate for
programs of the same size and scope, but larger more
complex programs will not have as much success.  Yet, in
xvii
order for the JFN/TES-N program and future programs using
Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral Development to
succeed, changes have to be made in policies such as
budgetary submissions, test and evaluation, policy,
process, and training.
xviii
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
There is a growing movement throughout the Department
of Defense (DoD) towards the implementation of Network
Centric Warfare (NCW). In efforts to transition to NCW, the
Navy has fielded many different systems and technologies.
One such system exploiting new technologies in the
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) domain
is the Joint Fires Network/Tactical Exploitation System-
Navy (JFN/TES-N), which was developed from the Army’s
Tactical Exploitation System, (TES-A).
This system was developed rapidly and uniquely for
fleet deployment in accordance with the interim acquisition
guidance signed by the Honorable Paul Wolfowitz. This
guidance authorized Evolutionary Acquisition following a
Spiral Development process in lieu of the “traditional”
cold war process described in the DoD 5000 series
publications. Assuming that JFN/TES-N will be viewed as a
successful acquisition, several Navy personnel have stated
that it may become the model for future C4I (and other)
system acquisitions. This thesis seeks to help develop that
model.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objectives of this thesis are two-fold:
• To examine whether the TES-N acquisition process
is an appropriate model of Evolutionary
Acquisition following a Spiral Development.
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• To identify and make recommendations for changes
or improvements to the TES-N acquisition program,
so it can be use as a more appropriate model for
Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral
Development.
C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
1. Scope
This thesis examined the JFN/TES-N acquisition process
to determine whether this process should be followed as is,
modified, or abandoned in future acquisitions. Based on
this analysis, I made recommendations on what should be
retained as future doctrine and what needed to be fixed. I
also examined any problems and recommended solutions.
2. Methodology
Within DoD today, there are two different documented
development and acquisition processes: the traditional
process documented in the DoD 5000 series and the newer
Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral Development
process described in the October 30, 2002 memorandum signed
by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Paul
Wolfowitz.
In order to assess the suitability of the TES-N
acquisition process as a model for future system
acquisitions, and make recommendations for changes to it if
appropriate, I conducted a literature search to explicitly
determine the characteristics of each of these documented
processes. Next, I determined the salient characteristics
of the TES-N acquisition process through interviews with
key personnel at the TES-N program office. Next, I used the
breakdown of Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral
Development in the article, The Promise and Perils of
3
Spiral Acquisition: A Practical Approach to Evolutionary
Acquisition by COL Wayne M. Johnson, USAF (Ret) and Carl O.
Johnson as a model for Evolutionary Acquisition following a
Spiral Development and the DoD 5000 series documents,
specifically DODI 5000.2 Operation of the Defense
Acquisition System (Including Change 1 4JAN2001), as a
model for the “traditional” acquisition policy, to reveal
key points that highlight relative differences between the
two as a basis for characterizing the JFN/TES-N acquisition
process. I then surveyed fleet personnel to determine their
opinion on the new system’s performance. Finally, I
interviewed operators and decision makers aboard the USS
CORONADO, the flagship of Commander Third Fleet (C3F) and
make recommendations based upon my findings for future
programs with an acquisition process similar to
Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral Development.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
• What acquisition process is being used for the
JFN/TES-N?
• What is the “traditional” acquisition process
described by the 5000 series publications?
• What is Evolutionary Acquisition following a
Spiral Development?
• How does the JFN/TES-N acquisition process
compare to the “traditional” cold war philosophy
described in the 5000 series publications and the
new process of Evolutionary Acquisition following
a Spiral Development?
• What recommendations can be made to improve the
Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral
Development process based on the TES-N model?
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E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
Chapter II provides the role, history, and background
of TES-N, starting with how it first was developed by the
Army, and then was adopted by the Navy.
Chapter III provides a definition and description of
the “traditional” acquisition process as described in the
DoD 5000 series publications.
Chapter IV defines Evolutionary Acquisition following
a Spiral Development. A breakdown of Evolutionary
Acquisition following a Spiral Development is described by
COL Wayne M. Johnson, USAF (Ret) and Carl O. Johnson,
article, The Promise and Perils of Spiral Acquisition: A
Practical Approach to Evolutionary Acquisition.
Chapter V begins by further explaining why the United
States needs to change their acquisition process in order
to provide timely technology and intelligence to the war
fighter. Next, it explains the JFN/TES-N Evolutionary
Acquisition following a Spiral Development. This chapter
then uses the breakdown of spiral development in the
Johnson and Johnson article, as a model for Evolutionary
Acquisition following a Spiral Development and the DoD 5000
series documents as a model for the “traditional”
acquisition policy, to reveal key points that highlight
relative differences between the two as a basis for
characterizing the JFN/TES-N acquisition process.
Chapter VI provides conclusions and recommendations on
what can be improved and what should be used in future
acquisition programs such as the TES-N.
5
II. HISTORY OF THE TACTICAL EXPLOITATION SYSTEM
The goal of this chapter is to provide the reader
background on the role of the TES in its military
environment. It also provides a history of the TES-N,
starting with how TES first was developed by the Army and
then adopted by the Navy. It will further present a
background of the TES-N architecture and a description of
how TES-N operates in its environment.
A. BACKGROUND
In 1973, the Army created the Army Space Program
Office (ASPO), whose role was “developing systems to
integrate current and emerging national capabilities into
the decision-making process, a kind of networked
information system.” (Littman, 2002, p. 6) Since that time,
other programs have developed similar offices known as
Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP). In
1995, the ASPO decided to build a system called the
Tactical Exploitation System (TES)(for simplicity in the
thesis, the Army program will be called TES-A) that would
consolidate intelligence such as national and theater
imagery systems into one Multi-Intelligence system. It
would be a scaled down version of a few existing TENCAP
systems. These TENCAP systems to be replaced by TES-A were
the Modernized Imagery Exploitation system (MIES), Advanced
Electronic Processing and Dissemination System (EPDS), and
the Enhanced Tactical Radar Correlator (ETRAC). The TES-A
alone would provide the functional capability of all three
systems. (Littman, 2002, p. 38)
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The eventual commercial developer of the TES-A,
Northrop Grumman (NG), stated that they were to deliver a
system, which was:
Assured receipt of all-weather, day/night
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR)
information from national, theater and tactical
platforms…through all phases of military
operations, providing a real-time, correlated
imagery and SIGINT picture directly to the
tactical warfighter. (Littman, 2002, p. 38)
The Army developed the TES-A as a dual-base system
consisting of a TES Main (TES-M) and a TES Forward (TES-F).
“The main element (TES-M) remains in relatively secure
locations and provides detailed intelligence analysis and
support to the forward element (TES-F).” (Littman, 2002, p.
7) TES-F, unlike TES-M, is brought into forward areas and
operated on the battlefield. The maneuverability of TES-F
can be seen in Figure 1 below.
 Figure 1.   TES-Forward, Notice How the System Can Be
Mounted and Easily Transported on Light Trucks and
HMMWV’s (From: Littman, 2002, p. 39).
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In 1997, the Navy began to see the potential benefits
of adopting the TES-A to address land attack targeting from
surface ships. They initially wanted this particular ISR
system for three reasons: to leap ahead in technology, to
lead to interoperability and software sharing, and to form
a long-term relationship with the Army. (Lajoie, Interview,
2003 and Read Ahead for NFN)
Around this time, the Chief of Naval Reserves and
Chief of Naval Operations N6B received permission to
purchase a copy of the TES-A and to adapt it into what the
Navy called the Littoral Surveillance System (LSS). (Read
Ahead for NFN) This first variant of TES-A, the LSS, was
made up of TES-F and a Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare
System Upgrade (MIUW-SU). According to Littman:
MIUW-SU consists of a Radar Sonar Surveillance
Center (RSSC) van, which is used as a command
center and an array of sensors. The sensors
include radar for aircraft detection and sonobuoy
processing for underwater target detection. This
was to provide complete littoral area
surveillance. (Littman, 2002, p. 7)
During 1998 through 2000, the LSS was built and tested
in Fleet Battle Experiment-Echo (FBE-E). (Littman, 2002, p.
7)
Later, Navy variants of the TES-A called the TES-N,
Remote Terminal Components (RTC) and Remote Terminal
Components Lite, were developed and deployed by the Navy.
Each variant is different, and used for different levels of
activity. Figure 2 depicts the three variants of TES-N used
today.
8
 
     Sensor Servers 
      -TES 
     Remote Servers 
     - RTC 
     Client  
    -RTC-LITEs 
 
 Figure 2.   The TES-N, RTC, and RTC-Lite (From: Thomas,
Joint Fires Network Overview, January 2003).
The Navy’s vision, of TES-N, is part of a system of systems
providing an end-to-end architecture for Time Sensitive
Targeting (TCT). However, the TES-N is only one component
of the system of systems. The others are currently JSIPS-N,
GCCS-M and an undetermined fire management system
generically referred to as Integrative Cooperative
Engagement (ICE). (Lajoie, Interview, 2003) In naming the
TES-N, RADM Mullen (now VADM selected to ADM), as N76,
coined the TES-N as Naval Fires Network (NFN)/TES-N as he
was preparing his Congressional briefings. This later was
renamed Joint Fires Network (JFN)/TES-N. (Burns, 2003)
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The TES-N is a complete system, and is equipped with
sensor servers which allow direct connectivity to the
sensor. The RTC has remote servers which cannot talk
directly to the sensors. They must receive the sensor
information via a full TES or some other intermediary, but
possess full processing capability. The RTC-Lites are
basically laptops/clients that are only used for visual
display of information in the fleet. (Lajoie, Interview,
2003) Figure 3 is a closer view of the Remote Terminal
Component aboard the USS Coronado.
 Figure 3.   Remote Terminal Component. (From: Littman,
2002, p. 52).
At this time, the Navy realized that they were
deficient in the TCT of NCW. Therefore, a key mission
capability that the Navy was trying to achieve using TES-N
was TCT. Through Fleet Battle Experiments (FBE) and Limited
Objective Experiments (LOE), the program office IWS 6C
wanted to ensure that the TES-N provided the capability to
do “Time Critical Targeting against rapidly relocateable
targets.” (NFN Read Ahead for N76)  The goal of the TES-N
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was to be able “… to correlate multiple off ship sensors’
data and intelligence with information from the tactical,
theater, and national levels.” (Littman, 2002, p. 41)  In
the end, JFN/TES-N would be able to collect data from the
sources of intelligence listed below with the ability for
Cross-Intelligence application and nodal analysis.
• SIGINT
• National data
• Real-time interface
• Theater SIGINT
• Modified GALE
• Real-time sensor control / tasking
• Combat assessment
• Imagery
• National imagery
• Direct Down Link (DDL) theater imagery
• COTS package for exploitation
• Real-time sensor control/tasking
• Accurate geo-location
• MTI
• Multiple Theater feeds (e.g. Global Hawk)
• Auto track and correlation
• Cross-cue/overlay (Thomas, Joint Fires
Network Overview, 2003)
Figure 4 shows how this would work.
11
 Figure 4.   TES-N Sensor Inputs (From: Littman, 2002, p.
42).
Throughout the TES-N development and fielding,
Commander 3rd Fleet (C3F) was an early sponsor and made an
active part of the TES-N lifecycle. C3F continually
monitored the productivity and functionality of the system.
Later, Third Fleet helped to conduct FBE and LOE to improve
TES-N because they realized it would help with operations
such as land attack and force protection in the fleet.
(Thomas, Interview, 2003)
In 2001, the TES-N was delivered to the USS Coronado.
Installing it on a ship brought operational insight to the
system engineers developing TES-N. Due to the
infrastructure of the ship, they could install the TES-N
without the infrastructure that the Army had used with TES-
A. Next, when the TES-N became operable on ships, the Navy
started to test the system through a series of LOE.
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Around this same timeframe, all systems of the TES
(meaning all variants of TES-A and TES-N) were being built
with an open and common architecture. The open architecture
of TES entails a common standard where no proprietary
hardware was used. It was all either government owned or
commercial, and computer components were required to be
commercial off the shelf. This was done so that it would
take less money to change components in the future. The
common architecture of the TES also means that all services
use a common software version, which was intended to mean
that there was a core version, and if one service needed a
new entity for the core, then they were entitled to build
it to fit the core while still making it readily available
to other services if they wanted its capability. (Lajoie,
Interview, 2003) In addition each service was funding its
individual requirements, but all services got to benefit
from the new capabilities added to the core. So far, this
cost sharing arrangement and joint configuration management
has proven to be very beneficial. (Burns, 2003) Therefore,
two rules were that no service could change the core and no
service could make a unilateral change if it affected the
core or hurt another service.
Also around this time, the United States Air Force
(USAF) and United States Marine Corps (USMC) began to
acquire variants of the TES. The USMC referred to it as the
Tactical Exploitation Group (TEG) and the USAF referred to
it as the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance-
Manager (ISR-M). The Marine Corps, like the Air Force,
realized that the interoperability of the system was a
great idea because they would benefit from the sharing of
targets and ISR. The Marine Corps also realized that to
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obtain this capability, they only had to evaluate and
update their system called, TEG. (Lajoie, Interview, 2003)
Even though, TEG and ISR-M have the same functionality as a
full TES-N or TES-A due to their common software baseline,
each service can chose doctrinally to use the system to
meet their specific service requirements and may or may not
take advantage of all the inherent tools and capabilities.
The common software, however, allows sharing of raw and
processed sensor data, targeting information, and other ISR
and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)
collaboration. (Burns, 2003)
Fortunately, the Army in 1999 had also made a “virtual
program office” for the development of the TES that
included all the services called the Joint Commonality
Board (JCB). (Lajoie, Interview, 2003) The Joint
Commonality Board is a virtual program office that acts
like one chain of command, but in reality, it does not
function that way. Ideally, all the services meet with
their user requirements and vet out which requirements are
going to be developed. Yet, each service is answering to
their respective chain of commands and making sure that
their services requirements are also being met. From the
beginning, all services were on board but only the Navy and
Army were contributing money. (Lajoie, Interview, 2003)
Since the TES-N is constructed with a common architecture,
the program office is currently working on Version 6.0 of
the software and has fielded some of these TES systems seen
below in Figure 5.
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 Figure 5.   Fielded TES Systems (From: Thomas, Joint
Fires Network Overview, January 2003).
As for its hardware technology, since Moore’s law states
that the computing power of a computer will double every 18
months, the TES-N will continue to be updated each year to
keep up with hardware changes. The TES-N will also be
updated to changes in user’s needs. Below is a figure of
what the TES-N program office (IWS 6C) hopes to accomplish
in 2003. This list is more specific to the Navy’s needs but
there are also requirements that the Army, USMC, and USAF
hope to accomplish.
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•  AMSTE II Integration  Fire Control & Weapon Quality MTI 
•  JTAAC  integration  Adaptation of AADC Functionality for Land Attack 
•  ADOCS/AFATDS Integration Engagement Grid Interface 
•  Tactical Control System   Integration of Common UAV Control System 
•  NCCT Integration  Airborne Sensor Networking (EP-3, EA-6B, RJ, etc.)
•  SIGINT Targeting              Fire Control/Weapon Quality SIGINT Geo-location 
•  CADP Development  X, Ku Phased Array Antenna Development 
•  Classified Sensor Integration              Classified (2 Different Sensors) 
•  RTC Lite Development  Windows based TES data access and Display 
•  Tactical Dissemination Module Move Aircraft uplink from LOS to Link 16 to IP 
•  Improved Networking   Improve TES Networking & DB replication 
•  Force Protection Package  Integration of Force Protection Sensors  
PMS 454 P3I activity in 2003
 Figure 6.   PMS 454 P3I Activity in 2003 (From: Thomas,
Joint Fires Network Overview, January 2003).
B. THE SIX LAYER PICTURE OF THE TES-N
In order to understand the composite picture of the
TES-N, one must understand the TES-N’s six-layer picture.
TES-N creates a composite picture for the
tactical war fighter by stacking all of its
inputted data in a logical way. Essentially, six
different layers make up the composite picture
This stack…is built by combining the data from
the many sources including: electronic
maps/charts, tactical and national imagery
(IMINT), Moving Target Indicator (MTI) and track
data from airborne sensors, signals intelligence
(SIGINT) both from the Miniaturized Data
Acquisition System (MIDAS) and from the global
broadcast system (GBS), graphical data, and
imagery interpretation reports (IIR). TES-N can
then display the composite data in various ways
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that can support the myriad missions today’s
warfighters find themselves in. (Littman, 2002,
p. 40)
 Figure 7.   Stacked Information Layers (From: Littman,
2002, p. 43).
The TES-N architecture is made up of six layers, each
possessing different functions. More specifically, the
first or base layer is composed of maps so that the system
can obtain latitudes and longitudes for its targets and
intelligence data. The digital maps, which can be updated
as needed, are taken from the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency (NIMA). Layer 2 is made up of tactical and national
imagery. Tactical imagery comes from numerous air and
ground sensors such as F-18’s and UAV’s. Layer 3 …”is
composed of Moving Target Indicator (MTI) and other track
data sent to TES-N from a [capable] aircraft.” (Littman,
2002, p. 48, The word capable is not in the quote)  The
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fourth layer receives signals intelligence from sources
such as National SIGINT, SCI level SIGINT, and SIGINT from
the Miniaturized Data Acquisition System (MIDAS). The fifth
layer is made up of the Graphical Situation Display (GSD),
which helps improve the asset organization and the
commander’s situational awareness. The sixth layer’s
Imagery Interpretation Reports (IIR) further improves the
commander’s situational awareness and asset organization.
“All six of the layers’ functionalities can be toggled on
or off by the operators to produce the most relevant
picture for a given situation.” (Littman, 2002, p. 50)
Finally, to locate information, an operator has flexibility
within each layer by being able to scale in or out for the
data required.
C. HOW THE JFN/TES-N WORKS
The JFN/TES-N is a joint end-to-end architecture for
Time Sensitive Targeting. The system merges the
capabilities from ISR, targeting, mission planning, and
situational awareness in order to strike an accurate
target. As seen in Figure 8 below, the TES-N first detects,
collects and displays the data from sensors and data links
in real time. This data is then exploited using its
intelligence subsystems so that commanders can make real
time, accurate decisions about targets. These targets are
assigned to different weapons systems so that they can be
attacked. (Blackledge, 2002, p. 5)
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III. THE TRADITIONAL (AS DESCRIBED BY THE 5000
SERIES PUBLICATIONS) APPROACH TO ACQUISITION
This chapter provides the reader with an understanding
of the acquisition process and policy that has been
developed over the past fifty plus years. Readers need to
understand the old process to better understand the changes
and why these changes are being made.
Since before the cold war, DoD’s systems acquisition
has been following a policy that prescribes a phased
process for developing a system. This process follows a
path of finishing one activity, obtaining approval and then
proceeding to the next activity. Each year the DoD also has
an established way of submitting a budget so that they can
allocate obligation authority to each program accordingly.
Furthermore, there is a policy for conducting tests and
evaluations for programs. The phased process is a formal
and organized way of acquiring systems, which has been
used, evolved, and tailored for over fifty years, but due
to rapidly changing technology, many believe that this
acquisition policy is performed in an inefficient way that
produces outdated results. Some key points I hope to
highlight in this chapter are that the “traditional”
process is accomplished in phases and milestones, it must
have an Operational Requirements Document (ORD) and Mission
Needs Statement (MNS), and policies such as budgetary
submissions and test and evaluation are developed according
to this old policy.
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A. THE DODI 5000.2 ACQUISITION PROCESS
According to DoDI 5000.2, Operation of the Defense
Acquisition System, an acquisition program is:
A directed, funded effort designed to provide a
new, improved, or continuing materiel, weapon, or
information system or service capability in
response to a validated operational or business
need. Acquisition programs are divided into
different categories that are established to
facilitate decentralized decision-making,
execution, and compliance with statutory
requirements. Technology projects are not
acquisition programs. (Defense Acquisition Desk
Book Site, DODI 5000.2 Operation of the Defense
Acquisition System, Enclosure E2.1.2)
The Defense Acquisition System consists of a series of
phases and control gates which control the development of a
new program by balancing the risks and benefits while
controlling the costs of that system. DoDI 5000.2
establishes the Defense Acquisition System as a process,
which translates a user’s Mission Needs Statement and
business requirements, and the latest technology
capabilities into a system that is useful for the user. A
model of a defense acquisition management program is shown
below. It is broken down into three activities called Pre-
Systems Acquisition, Systems Acquisition, and Sustainment.
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 Figure 9.   The 5000 Model (From: Defense Acquisition
Desk Book Site, DODI 5000.2 Operation of the Defense
Acquisition System).
These three activities are then further divided into
four more phases, the first and third activity having one
phase and the second activity having two phases. For
example, the first phase is Concept and Technology
Development. Next, each phase is divided into the specific
work efforts achieved in that phase. For example, the work
efforts in the Concept and Technology Development phase are
Concept Exploration and Component Advanced Development.
These are described below. Each phase also has entrance and
exit criteria, which establish whether the project is ready
to enter or exit its future or existing phase respectively.
Entrance criteria for a phase are the minimum
accomplishments that must be completed by a program before
it is allowed to enter the next phase. Similarly, exit
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criteria are defined as program specific results that must
be reached by the end of the phase. In addition, there are
three important milestones in the overall process. The
program office must ensure that there is an approved MNS in
order to start the program at Milestone A, which happens
before Concept Exploration. To pass Milestone B, which
occurs right before Systems Integration, they must ensure
they have an approved ORD. In order to proceed past
Milestone C, which is right before the work effort known as
Low-Rate Initial Production, the system must be approved
for low rate initial production by the correct approving
authority.
B. THE DESCRIPTION OF THE DODI 5000.2 MODEL
During the Pre-Systems Acquisition action, which is
also known as the Concept and Technology phase, the key
objectives are to ascertain user requirements and the
technological opportunities that are available for the new
system. This phase is divided into work efforts called
Concept Exploration and Component Advanced Development (as
seen below).
In the Concept Exploration stage, the program office
conducts paper studies of alternative concepts for meeting
the user requirements listed in the MNS. The exit criterion
for Concept Exploration is that the program office realizes
that they have a specific concept that can be developed
with existing technology. The program office enters the
Component Advanced Development stage to start the system’s
architecture once they are sure the concept is sound. In
this stage, the engineers continually study concepts that
might be helpful to further technological advancement of
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this system. In order for the program to proceed to the
next phase, it is necessary to demonstrate that the system
architecture and technology of the system are in their
relevant environments as described by the MNS.
 Figure 10.   Concept and Technology Development Work
Content (From: Defense Acquisition Desk Book Site,
DODI 5000.2 Operation of the Defense Acquisition
System).
The next activity is the Systems Acquisition Activity,
which occurs across both the System Development and
Demonstration Phase and the Production and Deployment
Phase. DoDI 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition
System, states that:
The purpose of the System Development and
Demonstration phase is to develop a system,
reduce program risk, ensure operational
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supportability, design for producibility, ensure
affordability, ensure protection of Critical
Program Information, and demonstrate system
integration, interoperability, and utility.
Discovery and development are aided by the use of
simulation-based acquisition and test and
evaluation and guided by a system acquisition
strategy and test and evaluation master plan
(TEMP). System modeling, simulation, test, and
evaluation activities shall be integrated into an
efficient continuum planned and executed by a
test and evaluation integrated product team (T&E
IPT). (Defense Acquisition Desk Book Site, DODI
5000.2 Operation of the Defense Acquisition
System, 4.7.3.2.1.1)
The System Development and Demonstration Phase is
divided into two system work efforts: Systems Integration
and Systems Demonstration (as seen below).
 Figure 11.   System Development and Demonstration Work
Content (From: Defense Acquisition Desk Book Site,
DODI 5000.2 Operation of the Defense Acquisition
System).
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In Systems Integration, the program office
concentrates on the integration of subsystems and the
cutback of integration risk. In order to enter into Systems
Demonstration, the prototypes developed in System
Integration must be functioning in a relevant environment.
During Systems Demonstration, the systems engineers and
contractors complete development, demonstrate engineering
development models, and conduct combined developmental and
operational testing. The program may exit this phase and
enter the Production and Deployment activity only after
sufficient testing and a successful system demonstration in
its intended environment.
In the Production and Deployment Phase, the program
office hopes to establish an operational capability that
was requested earlier through the MNS. This phase is also
further divided into two parts: Low-Rate Initial Production
and Full-Rate Production and Deployment (as seen below).
 Figure 12.   Production and Deployment Work Content
(From: Defense Acquisition Desk Book Site, DODI 5000.2
Operation of the Defense Acquisition System).
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In order for a program to start Low-Rate Initial
Production, the program must obtain approval from the
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) (discussed below). This
will ensure that the program office has completed a list of
requirements such as an approved ORD, acceptable
interoperability, suitable operational supportability,
demonstration that the system is affordable throughout the
life cycle, adequate information assurance to include
information assurance detection and recovery, and up to
standard anti-tamper provisions. During Low-Rate Initial
Production, not only is the system going through low-rate
production, but it also has a set of tests that it must
pass, such as initial operational test and evaluation
(IOT&E) and live fire test and evaluation (LFT&E). It also
must be established whether the system is ready for full-
rate production (FRP). Once the system has been deemed
operationally effective by the Operational Test and
Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR) and ready for full-rate
production, it is then allowed to enter the Full-Rate
Production and Deployment stage. In order to exit this
activity, the system must have full operational capability
and the deployment must be complete.
Finally, the purpose of the last activity, entitled
Sustainment, is to provide affordable support of the system
throughout its life cycle. This activity is called the
Operations and Support Phase and is also divided into two
parts: Sustainment and Disposal (as seen below).
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 Figure 13.   Operations and Support Work Content (From:
Defense Acquisition Desk Book Site, DODI 5000.2
Operation of the Defense Acquisition System).
In the first part, the work effort is concentrated on
operational support and in the latter; it focuses on
disposal or demilitarization of the system. For the
purposes of this thesis, the description of the 5000.2
model, which is the baseline for “traditional” acquisition,
is complete.
C. CATEGORIES OF ACQUISITION POLICY
There are three different acquisition categories in
the “traditional” process of acquisition as explained by
the 5000 series documents. The process which each program
follows depends on the specific acquisition category in
which it is placed. The different acquisition categories in
order from largest/most complex to smallest/simplest, are
Acquisition Category I, (ACAT I), Acquisition Category II
(ACAT II), and Acquisition Category III (ACAT III). Each
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category has requirements, which the program office must
meet and obtain approval for before they proceed to the
next activity in the “traditional” process. In addition,
all acquisition programs should have a MDA; of course, the
rank and position of the MDA varies according to ACAT.
Therefore, each program is mapped into one of three
categories, where they follow similar regulations but at
varying degrees of authority.
D. OBLIGATION AUTHORITY
Finally, the way in which obligation authority is
allocated for each system development is directly linked to
the “traditional” process of acquisition as described by
the 5000 series publications. Right now the DoD uses a
system called The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System (PPBS), whose purpose “is to provide the optimal mix
of forces, equipment, and support, which can be achieved
within fiscal restraints.” (AFMC Financial Management
Handbook, Updated December 2001) The PPBS is a plan for
developing DoD’s budget request, which is sent to the
president for approval and made a part of the President’s
Budget that is sent to Congress. Within the PPBS:
the odd-numbered calendar years are used to
concentrate on the DoD planning process. During
the even-numbered years, the Services formulate
and submit their Program Objective Memorandum
(POM) and BES (Budget Estimate Submissions) to
the OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense). The
PPBS is a continuous process with PPBS activities
from one year overlapping with PPBS activities
applicable to other years. (AFMC Financial
Management Handbook, Updated December 2001)
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Congress knows how much obligation authority the
program office desires for each system based on these
submissions, and then later decides how much they are
willing to appropriate for each program. Congress knows the
desires of the program office since each service has stated
the amount of obligation authority needed and its purpose
in their POM and BES. This process is efficient for the
phased process described by the 5000 series documents, but
for Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral Development
this would not be effective since Program Managers do not
know the purpose of their obligation authority so far in
advance.
This acquisition policy has been followed since before
the Cold War. It is a phased process consisting of a series
of phases and control gates, which control the development
of a new program by balancing the risks, costs, and
benefits of that system. This process also follows
budgetary rules set up by the DOD’s PPBS. This acquisition
policy, along with other budgetary and testing policies,
are considered outdated processes which need to be changed
so that changes in today’s technology can be more
effectively tracked.
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IV. EVOLUTIONARY ACQUISITION FOLLOWING A SPIRAL
DEVELOPMENT
A. THE SPIRAL PROCESS DEFINITION
The goal of this chapter is to provide the reader with
a clear understanding of Evolutionary Acquisition following
a Spiral Development.
As can be seen, the phased process described in the
Department of Defense 5000.2 directive draws system
development and acquisition out over a long period of time.
Unfortunately, developments with this phased process might
not be ready for use until several years later. This is
disadvantageous to the United States especially when
dealing with C4I systems since information technology is
changing so rapidly. Therefore, the DoD acquisition policy
needs to produce higher performance, with a more rapid
deployment of the system. The acquisition policy that has
been in use since before the Cold War needs to be changed.
Some major goals of this new process would be to lessen the
restrictiveness used in the policy by giving more flexible
decision authority to the program manager. (Evolution of
the DOD Acquisition Process: In a Nutshell)
Most of these changes were enacted on October 30,
2002, when Deputy Defense Secretary the Honorable Paul
Wolfowitz signed guidance that gave relief from some of the
current policies outlined in documents such as: DOD
Directive 5000.1, "The Defense Acquisition System"; DOD
Instruction 5000.2, "The Operation of the Defense
Acquisition System"; and DOD 5000.2-R, "Mandatory
Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs and Major
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Automated Information System Acquisition Programs." Deputy
Defense Secretary Wolfowitz wrote that "the intent of the
guidance is to rapidly deliver affordable, sustainable
capability to the warfighter that meets the warfighter's
needs." (Plummer, 2002) The Honorable Mr. Wolfowitz
continued to say that this new policy would hopefully
create an environment in the acquisition community that
would encourage “efficiency, flexibility, creativity and
innovation.” The hope of this new directive was to give
program offices the freedom to streamline their programs as
they saw fit. Yet, he still hoped that they would develop
systems whose standards were just as high. (Plummer, 2002)
The type of acquisition that the Honorable Mr.
Wolfowitz promoted is Evolutionary Acquisition following a
Spiral Development. According to the Department of Defense:
Evolutionary acquisition is DoD’s preferred
strategy for rapid acquisition of mature
technology for the user.  An evolutionary
approach delivers capability in increments,
recognizing, up front, the need for future
capability improvements.  The success of the
strategy depends on the consistent and continuous
definition of requirements and the maturation of
technologies that lead to disciplined development
and production of systems that provide increasing
capability towards a materiel concept.
(http://dod5000.dau.mil/Memo50002Oct30.doc)
Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral
Development is completely different. It cannot be carried
out following the “traditional” acquisition process as
described by the 5000 series documents. It needs to follow
a spiral process, a process where:
…a desired capability is identified, but the end-
state requirements are not known at program
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initiation.  Those requirements are refined
through demonstration and risk management; there
is continuous user feedback; and each increment
provides the user the best possible capability.
The requirements for future increments depend on
feedback from users and technology maturation.
(http://dod5000.dau.mil/Memo50002Oct30.doc)
This Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral
Development can be viewed below. The figure tries to depict
that there is an initial desired capability but the end
product is not known. It further emphasizes that at the end
of each spiral user feedback is analyzed along with changes
in technology to produce new requirements for the next
spiral.  This process happens faster than the “traditional”
process as described by the 5000 series documents and
produces a product to the fleet at the end of each spiral.
 Figure 14.   A Figure Depicting Evolutionary Acquisition
following a Spiral Development (From:
http://dod5000.dau.mil/Memo50002Oct30.doc).
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B. EVOLUTIONARY ACQUISITION FOLLOWING A SPIRAL PROCESS
A literature search of articles and doctrine on
Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral Development
such as DoD doctrine from memos entitled Operation of the
Defense Acquisition System, and articles by Dr. Stuart
Starr, The Requirements Process for the Acquisition of
Command and Control Systems: Needs, shortfalls, and
Challenges, and the article, Assessing Military Information
Systems, revealed COL Wayne M. Johnson, USAF (Ret) and Carl
O. Johnson’s breakdown of Evolutionary Acquisition
following a Spiral Development in their article, The
Promise and Perils of Spiral Acquisition: A Practical
Approach to Evolutionary Acquisition, to be most helpful
and accurate.
There are key facts of the Evolutionary Acquisition
following a Spiral Development that a program office must
know and consider before adopting it into their program.
One must first realize that Evolutionary Acquisition
following a Spiral Development will not work for all
programs. In my opinion the “traditional” approach as
described by the 5000 series documents would be better for
larger/ more complex programs. There are specific
characteristics, which Evolutionary Acquisition following a
Spiral Development is appropriate. For example, Johnson and
Johnson state:
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The intended spiral acquisition characteristics
are large proportion of commercial technology or
previously developed military technology; a
desire to shorten technology insertion life
cycles; schedule urgency; flexibility in
requirements for later insertions and budgetary
uncertainty. (Johnson and Johnson, Summer 2002,
p. 177)
Also, unlike the phased approach explained earlier,
the program office using Evolutionary Acquisition following
a Spiral Development usually has an end goal but each
spiral is not completely developed beforehand, and
therefore, not preplanned until the next spiral. This means
that the program office can only determine what needs to be
accomplished in the next spiral by determining what was
finished effectively in the current spiral. Thus, the main
goal of the Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral
Development is developing a series of smaller projects,
which in turn, are returned to the user more rapidly.
Johnson and Johnson then break up the Evolutionary
Acquisition following a Spiral Development into three main
components, which can be summarized under the titles
Requirements Definition, Acquisition Strategy, and
Employment Concept. These three components help define what
is needed for a spiral.
1. Requirements Definition
For the Requirements Definition component of this new
approach, Johnson and Johnson state, “the user has to be
involved up front and understand the desired end state
solution will not come with the first delivery.” (Johnson
and Johnson, Summer 2002, p. 178) Next, the program must
have a way of doing business that includes the user in each
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increment of the spiral. This means that the user must help
determine at each spiral what the program needs and then
there must be a process through which the program office
and the user both decide on what is essential for the next
spiral of the project. Thus, continuous communication,
trust, teamwork and regularly held meetings are essential
for obtaining the correct requirements and achieving
success within each spiral. The system requirements are
stated in a document that resembles an ORD from the
“traditional” 5000 series approach, but it is called a
Spiral Requirements Document (SRD) instead. This document
lists the user’s essential requirements for the system, but
the users also have an understanding that the system might
be less than perfect or 80% effective. The users “… will
test it, field it, and use it knowing it does not meet all
their needs, but it does have operational utility.”
(Johnson and Johnson, Summer 2002, p. 179) Therefore, there
must be flexibility and balance between the users and the
program office to establish the requirements. One can
already see the three main differences between the 5000
series approach. “First, in a [Evolutionary Acquisition
following a] Spiral [Development] …the program developer
may make improvements that do not readily seem to support
the end goal.” (Johnson and Johnson, Summer 2002, p. 180,
the words Evolutionary Acquisition following a and
Development are not in the quote) Next, the Evolutionary
Acquisition following a Spiral Development allows for the
developer to more easily put leading edge software into the
system. Lastly, in Evolutionary Acquisition following a
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Spiral Development, at the end of each spiral, the item is
not considered to be complete. Instead, another spiral will
be used to produce an upgrade quickly.
2. Acquisition Strategy
Next, the program office must develop an Acquisition
Strategy, which is a framework for translating the
requirements into actions. For this strategy, the program
office needs to develop constant communication and teamwork
with the users, developers, Spiral Development Integrated
Product Teams, and the Program Office. This includes
scheduled meetings of a Spiral Development Integrated
Product Team. This team will help the program office
provide insight to the user.
Flexibility like in the phased approach is also
important in the Acquisition Strategy. First, the program
manager must look for long-term flexibility in the project,
and must realize that appropriations from Congress can
change, and therefore, must be willing to accept budget
cuts. A solution for budget cuts for Evolutionary
Acquisition following a Spiral Development that cannot be
done in the phased approach would be to move a requirement
from one spiral to the next. Another difference between the
phased approach and Evolutionary Acquisition following a
Spiral Development is that flexibility in testing must also
exist. “The testing community cannot become rigidly fixed
on an end requirement or a [Evolutionary Acquisition
following a] Spiral Development will not work.” (Johnson
and Johnson, Summer 2002, p. 181, the words Evolutionary
Acquisition following a are not in the quote) Therefore,
testing procedures need to be assessed so that user is
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still getting a safe product but with the understanding
that more testing is needed before there will be an end
result. In Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral
Development, one must also learn how to manage risk by not
allowing the burden of success to be based on too much
technology or capability in one spiral at a time.
Therefore, Johnson and Johnson recommend breaking up the
development into smaller compartments. In other words,
“keep the critical path simple and singular.” (Johnson and
Johnson, Summer 2002, p. 181)
3. Employment Concept
The Employment Concept component of Evolutionary
Acquisition following a Spiral Development can be a little
more challenging than the approach described by the 5000
series documents, but the output is produced more quickly.
In this part of Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral
Development, the user must work directly with the program
office and testers to determine “...the priority list of
capabilities they would like to see fielded. This gives the
program office a means to make focused decisions.” (Johnson
and Johnson, Summer 2002, p. 183) This is more challenging
in Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral Development
because the Program office is continuously getting new user
requirements and then making sure that the testers and
engineers know and agree with these requirements. The
challenge is that these requirements are constantly
changing as opposed to the phased approach were once the
requirements are composed they do not usually change as
rapidly.
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The logistics team during Evolutionary Acquisition
following a Spiral Development must be very skilled because
there are usually multiple configurations of the system
fielded at the same time. The multiple configurations of
the system are disadvantageous, but this happens today with
the 5000 series approach due to unplanned occurrences, and
in the spiral approach, the program office is doing upfront
planning for this logistics challenge by realizing that
with each spiral there is a different system produced.
Therefore, logistics representatives early on are prepared
for different configurations of the same development making
it easier for maintenance and training.
In conclusion, there are many advantages to
Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral Development and
some disadvantages. Some advantages over the traditional
form of acquisition are that capabilities are delivered
quicker to the warfighter, the program office can manage
risk more efficiently, Evolutionary Acquisition following a
Spiral Development is more receptive to user needs, and
technology changes can be applied to the system more
easily. Some aspects to be cautious of when using
Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral Development for
their program are: Evolutionary Acquisition following a
Spiral Development could be looked at as an easy budget cut
by Congress due to its flexibility between spirals, test
teams must realize that partial capability must be looked
at initially, logistics teams must be willing to support
multiple configurations that are fielded, the user must
understand that they are not going to get their final
product in the first spiral but probably an 80% effective
system, and they must understand that their program will be
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subject to false comparison. “… The question will be, ‘Why
fund the new system that does not greatly perform over the
older system?’” (Johnson and Johnson, Summer 2002, p. 186)
Even with these drawbacks to Evolutionary Acquisition
following a Spiral Development, the benefits in the long
run are significant for many programs.
Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral
Development is the acquisition policy of the future for
most systems. It has many advantages and some
disadvantages. Overall there must be a strong relationship
with users, contractors, the program officer, and testers
for this Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral
Development to work.
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V. THE TES-N ACQUISITION PROCESS
This chapter further explains why the United States
needs to change its acquisition policy in order to provide
timely technology and intelligence to the warfighter. Next,
it explains the JFN/TES-N Evolutionary Acquisition
following a Spiral Development process. This chapter then
uses the breakdown of Evolutionary Acquisition following a
Spiral Development in the Johnson and Johnson article as a
model for Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral
Development and the DoD 5000 series documents as a model
for the “traditional” acquisition policy. These models are
then compared to reveal key points that highlight relative
differences between the two, and these differences serve as
a basis for characterizing the JFN/TES-N acquisition
process.
A. TIMELY INTELLIGENCE AND SUCCESS IN WARFARE
History has shown that timely intelligence can lead to
improved battlefield performance. In June 1941, in the
Battle of Midway, the United States defeated the Japanese
in a battle that demonstrated how timely intelligence
provided to the warfighter could change the outcome of a
battle. ADM Yamamoto Isoroku’s command had major advantages
in force structure, technology, training, experience,
morale, and inertia. Yet ADM Chester W. Nimitz, whose only
advantage was in timely intelligence, was victorious over
the Japanese. (Blackledge, 2002, pp. 3-4)
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The United States Navy learned from engagements like
the Battle of Midway that timely intelligence was necessary
for success in the past. Now we are engaged in a new type
of warfare —War on Terrorism— where timely intelligence is
even more important. Fortunately, at the same time that the
War on Terrorism began, the Navy was in the process of
fielding a new system, TES-N, which provided a great
capability for gathering and disseminating this
intelligence. However, the only way to rapidly deploy this
system to support the war on terrorism was through an
Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral Development
B. THE STEPS THAT LED TO TES-N DEVELOPMENT
On September 11, 2001, hijackers of two commercial
planes crashed them into the twin towers of the World Trade
Center in New York City, killing all passengers and large
numbers on the ground. Later a third commercial plane was
crashed into the Pentagon, causing hundreds of deaths and
turmoil in our country’s center of military leadership. The
next crash of a passenger plane by terrorists occurred in
Pittsburgh, killing everyone onboard.
(http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/WTC_MAIN010911
.html) Due to these attacks, Congress turned to the
military to provide better intelligence for the United
States. The Navy responded that they were working on the
development of JFN/TES-N, and Congress then urgently funded
development of the TES-N for rapid deployment. According to
CAPT Albert Thomas from NAVSEA IWS 6C:
After 9/11, Navy received emergency supplemental
funding (DERF) to rapidly deploy NFN capability
in the form of TES-N installations and JSIPS-N,
GCCS-M, and communications upgrades. In parallel
with executing these wartime operational
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deployments, the NFN Program office is developing
plans to continue spiral development and
acquisition of … the TES-N. (NFN Read Ahead for
N76)
Therefore, the Navy adopted an acquisition policy for
the TES-N, which is known as Evolutionary Acquisition
following a Spiral Development.
C. THE TES-N EVOLUTIONARY ACQUISITION SPIRAL DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS
The TES-N was developed due to an urgent and strong
need by the Navy for the intelligence capabilities
(described above) which the TES-N could provide to the
warfighter. Therefore, the normal way of starting an
acquisition, with a MNS and an ORD, was not followed.
Instead, there was direct approval from a Vice Admiral to
start development of the TES-N (due partially to the fact
that the Army had already developed their own TES).
(Thomas, Interview, 2002)
Initially the Army had developed the TES-A with
Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral Development, so
the Navy joined the Army Evolutionary Acquisition following
a Spiral Development of TES, which led to the Joint
Commonality Board being formed. In order to fully
understand the notion of Evolutionary Acquisition following
a Spiral Development that the TES took, one must understand
what the JCB is and what its roles are for the TES system.
As discussed in Chapter II, the JCB was formed earlier by
the Army to help organize the development of the TES
throughout all of the services. More specifically, the JCB
has a role of forming and maintaining the Integrated
Product Team (IPT) for the TES system development. Each IPT
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is co–managed by the government and a contractor, and each
IPT has a chief engineer that it must answer to about its
part of the system. There are teams for functions such as
security, SIGINT, fielding, and many more. Figure 3 shows
how the TES IPTs are structured. Each IPT has
representatives from each service to make sure that their
service’s needs are being met with each spiral of the TES.
TES IPTs
CHIEF ENGINEER
SOFTWARE BATTLE MGMT & TGTG
INTEGRATED EQUIPSIGINT
INTEGRATION & TESTNAT IMINT
FIELDINGTAC IMINTSIM & TRNG
ILS
COMMS
XINT & DATA SERVICES
SECURITY
 Figure 15.   Shows the Different IPTs in the TES-N
Program (From:  Lajoie, PowerPoint Slides, 2003).
This procedure provides checks and balances to assure
that each service’s user needs are being met. (Lajoie,
Interview, 2003).
The TES-N Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral
Development process was done in an 80/20-Spiral Development
schedule. The figure below represents the 80/20-Spiral
Development process.
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80/20 Spiral Development
. . . Maintaining A Common Baseline
1999 2000 2001 2002
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STATUS
RQMTS
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2003
Build 6.0
 Figure 16.   This Figure Depicts the 80/20 Relationship
of the TES-N Evolutionary Acquisition Following a
Spiral Development Process. Entities Listed are
Stakeholders for Each Process in the 80/20
Relationship. (From: Lajoie, PowerPoint Slides, 2003).
The 80/20-Spiral Development means that in the
beginning of a spiral or for the first 80% of the spiral
the decision making is done with the engineers having a
lead role about the development or systems engineering part
of the process, with the users in more of a reactor mode
and the program office staying in the control mode. In the
last 20 % of the spiral the user has more to say and acts
in a more leading role, while the engineers act in more of
the reactor mode, and the program office still behaves in
the control mode. With this 80/20 relationship in mind, the
Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral Development
goes through a series of steps, which happen in parallel
throughout the process. These steps are known as USER
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FEEDBACK, JCB, BUILD PROCESS, and STATUS. In the USER
FEEDBACK step, the program office and engineers receive
feedback from users and actions such as the fleet, Mobile
training Teams (MTT), command visits, CFFC testing, the
DOTMLPF filter, and institutional training. Next the JCB
looks at the user requirements and decides which user
requirements will be changed in the next spiral of the
system (the Navy representative on the JCB serves as an
advocate for fleet requirements). They evaluate such things
as risk, funding allotted, and recommendations from
different (IPT). Once a list has been made, the BUILD
PROCESS step lasts a maximum of one year. In this step
engineers design, develop, test, and upgrade the new TES
(and therefore TES-N) system. In the last activity, STATUS,
the program offices and IPT analyze what requirements were
met and then distribute the new system. The process then
starts all over again with the user assessing the new
system and coming up with feedback to improve it. With each
new run through these four activities, a new spiral is
formed in the development of the TES (and therefore the
TES-N).
More specifically, the TES-N program office built the
basic system with a test software version 1.0 in early
1999. They never fielded version 1.0, but with their in-
house testing of it came up with a list of deficiencies.
They quickly corrected these deficiencies and within the
same year developed and fielded version 2.0. The next
figure gives an idea of what new software was developed in
each TES-N spiral.
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Spiral Development Across The Services
. . . Maintaining A Common Baseline
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 Figure 17.   This Figure Shows What Changes Were Added to
the Software in Each Spiral of the TES-N (From:
Lajoie, PowerPoint Slides, 2003).
D. WHERE THE TES-N PROGRAM IS CURRENTLY AND WHAT IS THE
FUTURE OF THE PROGRAM
1. Current
Since the TES-N followed an Evolutionary Acquisition
following a Spiral Development form of acquisition, the
system currently has no Acquisition Category or Navy MDA,
per se. The NFN (now known as JFN) MNS which was signed on
13 Feb 02 recommended an ACAT III designation, but that has
not been officially adopted. But, the TES-N does get a
great deal of oversight from many masters, to include PEO
IWS, all three SYSCOMS (but primarily NAVSEA), the Virtual
Program Office, and the OPNAV staff. (Burns, 2003) Below is
a more complete list of TES-N stakeholders:
48
• PEO IWS - JFN
• PEO LSC - DDX
• PEO SHIPS - CVN 77 DEVELOPMENT
• PEO SUBMARINES – FLORIDA, SSGN
• NIMA - IMAGERY OVERSIGHT
• AGENCY - CLASSIFIED
• JCS - TES-J
• MDA - PROJECT K/DSP
• JTAMDO - SWA OPERATIONS/ATTACK OPS
• ESC, HANSCOM - ISRM
• NAVAL RESERVES - LSS
• MARCORSYSCOM – TEG, RTC
• ASPO - TES
• APL - JTAAC
• PEO IEW&S - DCGS ARMY
• MOBSTR - PROGRAM OFFICE
• ETP - PROGRAM OFFICE
• DARPA - MTES/AMSTE II/SIAP
• JFCOM - JACKNIFE ACTD
• ONR - X, KU BAND PHASED ARRAY ANTENNA DEVELOPMENT
• SAP - PROGRAM OFFICE
• NAVAIR – HARRY BUFFALO, EA-6B, JSOW (AMSTE II)
• AFRL - TUT
• FUTURE:  COAST GUARD - DEEP WATER (Burns, 2003)
Next, another important document which is called the
TES ORD by the TES-N program office is currently the
original Army ORD used with the TES-A system.
Unfortunately, there is still not an approved TES-N ORD,
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but on the other hand, there is now a renewed move to
produce a JFN ORD, which has been in development (and has
fallen in and out of favor) since last summer. (Burns,
2003) As for the TES-N position in the Evolutionary
Acquisition following a Spiral Development process, it
currently has a fielded, tested, and trained software
version 5.0.5. The program office has recently been working
on Build 5.2, which is essentially a “patch” that provides
the capability to test and demonstrate SHARP tactical
Imagery capability in TES-N. Build 5.2 is only being
deployed to Fallon for testing. The next Version, 6.0, is
in the development/testing stage of the spiral development
process and will be delivered this fall. Build 5.2
capability will be incorporated into the 6.0 software.
(Burns, 2003)
2. Future
The JFN/TES-N will continue to be updated with new
software, and the Honorable Mr. Young’s recent guidance
states that the Navy will converge its JFN architecture
onto a TES-N baseline.  How that convergence will take
shape is still to be determined, but one can possibly
foresee ideas such as JSIPS-N capabilities like Precision
Targeting Workstation (PTW) and JSIPS-N Concentrator
Architecture (JCA) being integrated into TES-N. (Burns,
2003)
E. EVOLUTIONARY ACQUISITION FOLLOWING A SPIRAL
DEVELOPMENT OR A TAILORED “TRADITIONAL” PROCESS
(SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES)
The JFN/TES-N program used Evolutionary Acquisition
following a Spiral Development as described by Johnson and
Johnson and a little of the “traditional” policy described
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in the 5000 series publications. In this thesis I have used
the Johnson and Johnson model for Evolutionary Acquisition
following a Spiral Development and the 5000 series
documents to describe the “traditional” process to
emphasize key points such as the Requirements Definition,
Acquisition Strategy, and test and evaluation procedure
that highlight relative differences between the two as a
basis for characterizing the TES-N acquisition process.
The first key point was that the JFN/TES-N program was
developed with urgency, and from a previously developed
military technology. These two characteristics immediately
provide a fitting reason, as according to Chapter IV, to
consider executing Evolutionary Acquisition following a
Spiral Development. Additionally, in the TES-N program, the
Program Manager CAPT Albert Thomas, continuously gathers
feedback about user needs from operators and decision
makers using TES-N. But, the TES-N program office did not
initially produce a MNS or ORD to get approved for
development of their system. (Thomas, Interview, 2003)
In comparing this to the Johnson and Johnson model,
some of this activity occurs in what these authors call the
Requirements Definition phase of a program. During, this
activity the user is involved up front and needs to be
continuously consulted for each spiral of the development.
Next in the Requirements Definition phase, the program
office must establish a SRD, but this did not happen in the
TES-N program. The user’s essential requirements for the
system are listed in the SRD, but the user also understands
that the system will be less than 80% effective. The TES-N
program did not have an SRD, but consulted an old ORD from
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the Army TES-A program. They also, later in the program
development, produced a MNS that was similar to the
“traditional” approach outlined in the 5000 series
documents, but was not written in the order that the
“traditional” approach follows. Below is an example of an
objective from the MNS of the JFN/TES-N program. It states:
Objectives. To generate targets by collecting and
collating detection data gleaned from a variety
of dispersed sensors and sources including sub-
surface, surface, air-breather or space-based,
fusing and transmitting that data to cognizant
commanders for threat evaluation, and engagement
platforms for weapons assignment in support of
the Joint Force Commander’s objectives. This MNS
documents the need to convey relevant information
required by the warfighter throughout the
“Detect-Control-Engage” sequence. (Mission Need
Statement For Naval Fires Network (NFN) ACAT III,
p. 2)
This MNS does reflect the 5000 series publications but
it was not done in the same sequence as the 5000 series
documents. This MNS statement was produced after
development and fielding of the system had taken place, not
before the system was approved for Concept Exploration.
Next, the program office had an Acquisition Strategy
for putting the requirements into action. In the TES-N
program, this was done through the JCB and the TES IPT. The
JCB and TES IPT provided constant communication for the
project. In visiting the program office, CAPT Thomas seemed
busy, continuously finding new user requirements and then
vetting out which ones could be solved and which ones would
be held to the next spiral. This gave me the idea that he
understood that his program never had an end capability and
that it would always be changing to take advantage of
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changing technology. According to Johnson and Johnson, in
the Acquisition Strategy for Evolutionary Acquisition
following a Spiral Development, the Program Manager
constantly looks for new user requirements for the next
spiral and they understand that there is flexibility in
their program, meaning there is no need to be rigidly fixed
on the end product. This was similar to what happened with
the TES-N program.
Next, the testing community in an Evolutionary
Acquisition following a Spiral Development also cannot be
fixed on the end capability. The TES-N program did not
follow the “traditional” test and evaluation phase, due to
the fact that they had no ORD to be tested, and they still
wanted a fast development of the capability. (Lajoie,
Interview, 2003) Instead, testing was done in events such
as LOE and FBE.  For example, a TES-N prototype was
successfully demonstrated in Fleet Battle Experiment-India
(FBE-I), an exercise event involving all four services
conducted in June 2001.  Based upon this successful
demonstration, COMTHIRDFLT recommended immediate deployment
of JFN aboard USS JOHN C. STENNIS (CVN 74) and USS ABRAHAM
LINCOLN (CVN 72), with COMNAVAIRPAC citing JFN as a
"critical capability." (Burns, 2003) CNO (N7) recommended
immediate acquisition and deployment of JFN/Time Critical
Strike capability.  In July 2001, the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) (ASN
RDA) designated a Naval Fires Network/Time Critical Strike
Program Director to integrate and synchronize acquisition
and deployment activities across the Navy's Systems
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Commands. Currently there is no efficient testing procedure
on Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral Development,
but doctrine is being developed. (Burns, 2003)
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter provides conclusions and recommendations
on what can be improved and what should be used in future
acquisition programs such as the TES-N.
Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral
Development shown with the TES-N system is an acquisition
policy of the future. This thesis shows that Evolutionary
Acquisition following a Spiral Development with the
JFN/TES-N system is an acquisition policy that is
appropriate for programs of the same size and scope, but
larger more complex programs will not have as much success.
This Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral
Development for small/low complexity programs provides
faster implementation of the system, involves the user
throughout the process, and allows each service to be up to
date with the changing effects of technology.  Yet, despite
all these benefits, there is still some work that must go
into other policies that affect Evolutionary Acquisition
following a Spiral Development. After a more in-depth look
into the TES-N program, one can see that future programs
following this type of acquisition policy will have issues
with areas such as budgetary submission, the role of
OPTEVFOR in their programs, policy, process, and training.
A. OPINIONS AND BENEFITS
In interviewing many officers, I found that varying
opinions have been formed regarding JFN/TES-N in the Navy.
According to CAPT Paul Hill, SPAWAR 05 Deputy for JFN, the
JFN/TES-N, system–of-systems, has shown that Evolutionary
Acquisition following a Spiral Development will provide
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tremendous improvements in technological capabilities and
attributes, but it has also proved that it is way ahead of
its CONOPS. (Hill, 2003) This means that the technology is
updated effectively but the support, logistics, and
training policies cannot keep up with these new
capabilities. Listed below are attributes and capabilities
of TES-N received from the Program Office. Next, CAPT
Christopher Bott, Commander Third Fleet, J2, stated that
the JFN/TES-N concept of a single box capability, which
allows access in real time, is a good one. He further
states TES-N is nearly ready but still is lagging with
inter-system problems between TES-N and GCCS-M; in
addition, the graphics could be improved. (Bott, 2003)
Furthermore, CDR Olivarez, a strike Commander aboard the
USS CORONADO, he commented that when he was aboard the USS
LINCOLN, he found that not many operators knew how to use
the TES-N. In addition, operators and aviators needed to
understand each other’s requirements for TES-N. (Olivarez,
2003)
B. LIST OF CAPABILITIES AND ATTRIBUTES THAT JFN/TES-N
PROVIDED
• Attributes:
• Competitive award
• 100% Government owned
• Non-proprietary
• Spiral development
• Configuration managed by a 4 Service JCCB
• Common software baseline
• Over 65% of content by other contractors
• Common workstations for all Services
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• Multi-INT architecture:
• Sensor access, control and management
• Situational awareness
• Mission planning and monitoring
• Exploitation
• Communications and dissemination
• Software Architecture:
• Open and Non-proprietary
• ICDs and APIs documented but controlled by
Government
• Commercial standards compliant
• Over 115 COTS/GOTS products integrated
• IP based internal and external network
interfaces
• Scalable:
• Hosted on a variety of platforms across all
Services; Vannized, shipboard, rack mounted,
transit case, and airborne
• Software is issued in a configuration-
managed version across all Services.
• Major upgrade typically once per year, minor
upgrades as needed.
• Service may chose not to purchase a
particular COTS license (capability not
fielded).
• Jointness:
• Over 40 systems fielded and operating world-
wide
• OIF supported by a TES variant from each
Service
• Supports National thru Unit level
• Sharing, files, data, Intel daily
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• Footprint TES supports other disadvantaged
nodes
• Army: TES Forward, TES Main, DTES
• Navy: TES-N, RTC, RTC Lite
• USMC: TEG, RTC
• Air Force: ISR-M Host, ISR-M Remote (Burns,
2003)
Even with these impressive capabilities, the JFN/TES-N
acquisition still encountered issues in other policies that
needed to be addressed. This includes policies in budgetary
submissions, test and evaluation, general policy and
process in the Navy, and training.
C. DRAWBACKS: FUNDING, TEST AND EVALUATION, POLICY,
PROCESS, AND TRAINING
The TES-N, due to its acquisition policy of
Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral Development,
did not use traditional methods in funding, test and
evaluation, policy, process and training. In order to avoid
similar problems in Evolutionary Acquisition following a
Spiral Development for future programs following this new
acquisition policy, there must be new procedures for test
and evaluation, budgetary submissions, policy, process, and
training in the Navy.
1. Funding
a. Problem
Traditionally, as according to the 5000 series
documents and as described in Chapter III, funding is
conducted according to the Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System (PPBS). The TES-N program could only
partially follow the guidelines of the PPBS because they
used the Army’s funding documents of the TES-A program. The
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TES-N program office can realistically provide an estimate
of how much money they intend to spend over the next
several years and what they intend to use it for, but in
reality, due to the Evolutionary Acquisition following a
Spiral Development, the program office only knows how much
funding they will need in the future once the users’
feedback is obtained. User feedback is only received after
the new development is brought into the fleet; therefore
the time constraints for Evolutionary Acquisition following
a Spiral Development do not allow for a funding policy that
acts in accordance with the PPBS. Moreover, other programs
like the TES-N might not have prior programs to base
funding on for the PPBS. In conclusion, since each spiral
depends on the previous spiral there is no way a program
manager can produce a Program Objectives Memorandum (POM)
for years in the future. (Lajoie and Thomas Interviews,
2003)
b. Solution
In my opinion there is not yet a clear and
definite answer to this problem. A recommendation based
upon research for this thesis would be that Program
Managers of Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral
Development need to work on explaining and teaching to the
budgetary submission analysts how Evolutionary Acquisition
following a Spiral Development works and that funding
requirements are obtained only once user feedback is
received. The Program Managers need to do this until the
budgetary submission analysts buy into the unique funding
developments of Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral
Development.
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2. Test and Evaluation
a. Problem
For each new development of a system, there must
be some sort of test and evaluation to determine if the
system is ready for delivery to the fleet. In the 5000
series documents, and as explained in Chapter III, the
testing role is lead by OPTEVFOR. This process is usually a
very long and detailed process. Since the TES-N was
developed in Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral
Development for quick fleet operational capability, it
bypassed the OPTEVFOR stage and went directly to the
certification stage for implementation into the fleet.
Later in the TES-N development program, Commander Fleet
Forces Command (CFFC) requested OPTEVFOR to test TES-N, but
OPTEVFOR was not sure what or how to test since there was
no new ORD produced and the Army ORD had already been
tested. In conclusion, this part of the TES-N acquisition
needs to be revised for future systems so OPTEVFOR can
clarify and then fulfill its role in testing a program that
has Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral
Development. (Lajoie, Interview, 2003)
b. Solution
According to a contractor for JFN’s resource
sponsor, N61, David Loneman, one cannot do away with Test
and Evaluation (T&E) and the role of the testers (OPTEVFOR)
but the internal organization needs to be changed. If you
did away with T&E the fleet would not feel comfortable
using the product developed. A solution to this might be
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hiring more people so the process of test and evaluation is
faster to keep up with technology but still is as
efficient. (Loneman, 2003)
Due to the changing policies in acquisition, I
believe the role of OPTEVFOR and documentation on
parameters for testing should be changed, too. For example
with the JFN/TES-N, the Evolutionary Acquisition following
a Spiral Development was done in an 80/20-Spiral
Development schedule. Usually OPTEVFOR tests compliance
with the ORD but in Evolutionary Acquisition following a
Spiral Development no ORD requirements will be initially
produced. In my opinion with this 80/20 relationship in
mind, OPTEVFOR should be provided different levels of ORD
requirements to review. This would include initial testing,
midterm testing and then a final testing when each
requirement is met (the final testing might not come for
many spirals so they would have to be patient). So
initially we would have more of a 70/20/10 relationship
(Engineers, Users, OPTEVFOR). OPTEVFOR needs to be involved
early in the project to make sure the project is safe,
while at the same time not delaying the program for fleet
use. Then at midterm a 60/20/20 relationship (Engineers,
Users, OPTEVFOR) should be used in Evolutionary Acquisition
following a Spiral Development. Finally when capability is
complete then it would become a 40/40/20 relationship. This
means OPTEVFOR is always in on the workings of the program
and does not have to wait to the end to test. According to
VADM (RET) Ted Parker, this kind of arrangement for
OPTEVFOR I suggested above can work, and has worked in the
past. He also commented on other suggestions such as:
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Getting OPTEVFOR OTDs involved very early is
healthy for any program and especially important
if one is not quite sure what the route is to the
final set of requirements.  If this is done, the
OTDs gain better understanding of what the
developmental item really is, and can apply
better judgment to issues that arise.  In my
experience, this permits a. much more opportunity
for DT&E to produce data that is useful to
Operational Evaluation of the system.  Sometimes,
it just requires a simple change (that can be
suggested by the OTD) to make a test that has no
operational content into one that has enough
operational content that the results can be
applied toward IOT&E. b. utilization of more DT&E
data and better understanding of the system. This
will usually avoid the problem of dumb tests
being conducted and paid for (saves money and
time). c. better thinking by the PM, because
he/she will have an opportunity to understand the
needs of the OTD and can get ready for them (do
better in OT&E). (Parker, 2003)
In conclusion, OPTEVFOR and program offices that
use Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral Development
need to work together to make a test and evaluation policy
that will be efficient with this new form of acquisition.
3. Policy and Process
a. Policy
(1) Problem. Some policies of the Navy need
to be changed. Policy was done differently for the JFN/
TES-N form of acquisition. For example, there was constant
leadership throughout this program. The Navy made a
decision to leave the Program Manager, CAPT Thomas, in the
same position since 1996. In acquisition programs such as
Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral Development it
is critical to have the same leadership since it takes a
long time to understand issues and make changes to the
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program. If they had reassigned him the program would have
eventually collapsed or fell behind. (Thomas, Interview,
2003)
(2) Solution.  According to CAPT Thomas,
the Program Manager for the JFN/TES-N, the Department of
the Navy should change their officer career path for
acquisition. For example, the pipeline would continue as
normal until X.O. level. At X.O. level, the board would
screen officers for acquisition billets. Then, if awarded
acquisition billets those officers would spend the next 15
years, plus, in acquisition. They would first act as Deputy
Program Managers so that they would get initial
understanding of the job. According to CAPT Thomas, it
takes time to understand the Program Manager concepts.
Next, the Navy would promote a percentage of the Deputy
Program Managers to Program Managers. As Program Managers,
they would stay on that specific program until the project
was complete or they were deemed incompetent. Also, by not
moving them until the project was finished, it would let
the Program Manager’s workers know that he/she was not
going anywhere, which would curtail “slow rolling” to wait
for change of leadership. (Thomas, Interview, 2003)
Within this new policy, one needs to ensure
integrity in the system being worked on. An answer to this
would be to give a bonus to keep the Program Managers from
retiring and working for the contractor when they retire.
Next, there needs to be a structure to account for human
nature. Most people in the acquisition business seem to be
very ambitious, aggressive, and very competent. But, when
there are large sums of money involved, people can be
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corrupted. Therefore everyone involved in the project needs
to have a personal interest to be successful. (Thomas,
Interview, 2003)
b. Process
(1) Problem.  This program also reveals a
struggle that the Navy has in its process and a problem
that might hold back future progress in fielding
technological support to this program. This problem builds
back up for user buy ins and training. For example, since
Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral Development has
been adopted it has created tension between three different
groups of people: OPTEVFOR and the developers, the
operators of the TES-N and the idea of having new system
ownership, and tensions between the different mentalities
of the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets. In LCDR Matt Hopson’s
opinion, the J2 Systems officer on USS CORONADO, the
capabilities of TES-N are there but there is a lack of
teamwork and proficiency throughout the project. For
example, OPTEVFOR needs to work with the developers, and
the developers need to work with OPTEVFOR to find a way to
efficiently test the Evolutionary Acquisition following a
Spiral Development process without taking four years, and
still keeping in mind that the capability is not yet
finished. The Navy also needs to challenge its operators to
take ownership of the new system and work with each other
to make sure it is producing the correct display of data.
Finally, there needs to be an alliance between the Pacific
and Atlantic Fleets to install this system in both fleets
at the same time. This system is supposed to provide
interoperability between all the services, but the Pacific
Fleet is the only one using it in the Navy. Thus, the Navy
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has moved away from this stovepipe philosophy with
Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral Development and
it needs to do this also with its processing procedures.
(Hopson, 2003)
(2) Solution. One possible solution
according to Destiny Burns from the program office,
involves creating greater fleet ownership of the system
through an institution of combined formal schoolhouses, on-
site training, and more "train-the-trainer" type of
activities, establishment of formal TES-N/JFN billets and
transition of logistics activities from the contractor to
the fleet. (Burns, 2003) An example of a near term plan
related to these tasks is that during Fiscal Year 2003, the
JFN Program Office established a customer support strategy
to engage Fleet users in the assessment/development of a
Performance Based Logistics (PBL) strategy in accordance
with ASN (RDA) Memorandum PBL Guidance Document of 27 Jan
2003.  Interim Defense Acquisition Guidebook of 30 Oct 2002
states that Program Managers shall establish logistics
support concepts and refine concepts throughout program
development.  JFN shall coordinate program requirements for
support across functional areas to minimize redundant
contract deliverables and inconsistencies. A JFN Product
Support Plan is being developed for all fielded JFN
systems. The Product Support Plan includes methods and
tools to track system performance, such as designation of a
JFN System Officer associated with each fielded system, to
enhance coordination and implementation of formal and
informal reporting and feedback procedures such as:
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• Sailor-to-Engineer Website Access
• Navy Integrated Call Center
• Remedy Database (Burns, 2003)
Another key JFN Integrated Logistics Support
(ILS) strategy is the transition of depot support, sparing,
and maintenance support from contractor to government
(fleet) control and responsibility. (Burns, 2003)
4. Training
a. Problem
As everyone knows, technology can not be used if
no one knows how to use it. The TES-N training system has
caused a delay in the use of TES-N operationally.
Currently, the normal training schedule is constant
training on the system for ten days (65 hours). TES-N is
not typically used right away, so when the operators are
about to use it they are given a quick refresher course.
Therefore, there is a huge gap between training and system
use, which causes proficiency to go drastically down.
(Hopson, 2003) This will be viewed from the results of a
survey I conducted on 06MAY03 and 07MAY03 given to the
operators and decision makers of the JFN/TES-N aboard the
USS CORONADO.
Table 1 presents results of a survey used to rate
the effectiveness of the JFN/TES-N training. It displays
the mean score and range from lowest to highest for each
question, using a seven-point scale. Participants were
asked to rate the number on the seven–point scale with
which they best agreed. The seven-point scale ranged from
1= Not at all Effective or Extremely Difficult (depends on
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the question) to 7 = Extremely Effective or Extremely Easy
(depends on the question). Below is an example of the
scales used in the survey.
1________2_______3_______4________5_______6_______7
Not     Somewhat           Moderately            Very    Extremely
Very      Extremely          Effective          Effective  Effective
Effective
1________2_______3_______4________5_______6_______7
Extremely   Very            Moderately            Very     Extremely
Difficult   Difficult       Difficult/Easy        Easy     Easy
The survey was administered to 11 operators and decision
makers of the JFN/TES-N; 11 completed surveys were returned
and analyzed.
    Survey Question                            Mean   Range
1. How effective was the training to operate
TES-N?
4 (2-5)
2. How easy was it to learn to use the TES-N? 3.6 (2-6)
3. How effective was the actual process that
was used (meaning combining all
intelligence people to work together) to
implement the new TES-N?
4.7 (2-6)
 Table 1.   Results of Survey on Effectiveness of
JFN/TES-N Training.
The question that asked about the effectiveness
of the TES-N training received a mean rating of 4,
indicating that it was moderately effective. Two
participants stated that the trainers/contractors were
better suited for tech support than operator training. They
explained that lots of training time was wasted due to the
trainer’s lack of operator experience with the machine.
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Another participant stated that they had received only on-
the-job training, which was helpful, but without formal
training and constant use the training was not effective.
Also an operator explained that the training was good but
the UNIX environment that JFN/TES-N operated in was non-
familiar and slowed the learning curve for many operators.
The next question asked about how complicated the
TES-N was to learn. The mean rating for this item was 3.6,
indicating that it was more than moderately difficult. One
participant stated that a reason TES-N was difficult to
learn was because there were so many parts to JFN/TES-N and
many operators and decision makers did not practice using
them everyday. Another operator commented that it needed to
be more user-friendly since the system step/functions were
not intuitive and there were too many steps involved in
completing one task. In contrast, another operator
commented that it seemed fairly user-friendly, especially
if you have a motivated instructor and get hands-on
training, then anyone should be able to learn the system.
The next question asked about the effectiveness
of the actual process that was used (meaning combining all
intelligence people to work together) to implement the new
TES-N. The mean rating for this question was 4.7, which
indicates that is was greater than moderately effective.
One operator rated this item as a 5 since the proximity of
all the intelligence sources and adaptation to the type of
intelligence flow allowed more timely fusion of
intelligence. Another operator agreed and said the process
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was effective last summer for the Millennium Challenge
Exercise. Another operator commented that better training
would help the process run even smoother.
With these survey questions analyzed I conclude
that training of the TES-N needs to be improved. It seems
that most operators and decision makers get on the job
training and not formal training of the JFN/TES-N. If
formal training is given then it is limited. Furthermore,
hands-on experience with the system is not occurring after
training is completed, therefore knowledge is lost.
Furthermore most Navy personnel have been trained on
Windows and not UNIX, which causes problems since the
operating system of TES-N is UNIX. In addition, the
training system also could be easier to utilize, meaning
there are too many steps to complete a task. Finally, the
TES-N process of combining all intelligence people to work
together seems to work but would run smoother with more
formal training and better doctrine.
b. Solution
A solution to the training dilemma might be to
follow what the Army initially did. The Army did their
initial training a different way. They formed a TES
organization before they started the development of the
TES-A. This organization included experienced operators who
were hand picked. (Thomas, Interview, 2003) This
integration went a lot smoother. Next, the Navy could have
sent more people to the Army training center to get more
formal training instead of on-the-job training for the
JFN/TES-N. Finally, there should be a human factors
training person involved in the initial spiral development
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of the system so they can help ensure a good Human System
Interface and document how to operate the new system as it
is being developed.
This thesis concludes that Evolutionary
Acquisition following a Spiral Development shown with the
JFN/TES-N system is an acquisition policy that is
appropriate for programs of the same size and scope, but
larger more complex programs will not have as much success.
Yet, in order for the JFN/TES-N program and future programs
using Evolutionary Acquisition following a Spiral
Development to succeed changes have to be made in policies
such as budgetary submissions, test and evaluation, policy,
process, and training.
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